Western University

Scholarship@Western
FIMS Publications

Information & Media Studies (FIMS) Faculty

2020

Politics and porn: how news media characterizes problems
presented by deepfakes, Critical Studies in Media Communication
Chandell E. Gosse
Western University, cgosse@uwo.ca

Jacquelyn Burkell
The University of Western Ontario

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fimspub
Part of the Library and Information Science Commons

Citation of this paper:
Gosse, Chandell E. and Burkell, Jacquelyn, "Politics and porn: how news media characterizes problems
presented by deepfakes, Critical Studies in Media Communication" (2020). FIMS Publications. 345.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fimspub/345

Critical Studies in Media Communication

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcsm20

Politics and porn: how news media characterizes
problems presented by deepfakes
Chandell Gosse & Jacquelyn Burkell
To cite this article: Chandell Gosse & Jacquelyn Burkell (2020): Politics and porn: how news
media characterizes problems presented by deepfakes, Critical Studies in Media Communication,
DOI: 10.1080/15295036.2020.1832697
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2020.1832697

View supplementary material

Published online: 24 Oct 2020.

Submit your article to this journal

View related articles

View Crossmark data

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rcsm20

CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA COMMUNICATION
https://doi.org/10.1080/15295036.2020.1832697

Politics and porn: how news media characterizes problems
presented by deepfakes
Chandell Gosse

and Jacquelyn Burkell

Faculty of Information and Media Studies, Western University, London, Canada
ABSTRACT

“Deepfake” is a form of machine learning that creates fake videos by
superimposing the face of one person on to the body of another in
a new video. The technology has been used to create nonconsensual fake pornography and sexual imagery, but there is
concern that it will soon be used for politically nefarious ends.
This study seeks to understand how the news media has
characterized the problem(s) presented by deepfakes. We used
discourse analysis to examine news articles about deepfakes,
ﬁnding that news media discuss the problems of deepfakes in
four ways: as (too) easily produced and distributed; as creating
false beliefs; as undermining the political process; and as nonconsensual sexual content. We provide an overview of how news
media position each problem followed by a discussion about the
varying degrees of emphasis given to each problem and the
implications this has for the public’s perception and construction
of deepfakes.
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Introduction
Deepfakes—fake videos that use artiﬁcial intelligence (AI) to place one person’s face
(learned from a set of existing images and video, known as a faceset) on to another
person’s body (known as a donor body)—were ﬁrst adopted to create non-consensual
sexual videos. Early productions were posted to Reddit and several pornography sites
online. These spaces celebrated sexual deepfakes and contributed to a “broader environment in which women’s images are understood as consumable, malleable, and brought
into being for the enjoyment and gratiﬁcation of men” (van der Nagel, 2020, p. 3).
Early press coverage by Motherboard writer Samantha Cole (2017, 2018a, 2018b,
2018c, 2018d) similarly focused on non-consensual sexual deepfakes and the associated
issues of the objectiﬁcation and violation of women in such videos (Cole, 2017). Deepfakes can be used for a variety of purposes, including entertainment, non-consensual pornography, and political misinformation, but news media typically focus on political uses
(Maddocks, 2020; van der Nagel, 2020). In this study, we use discourse analysis to understand how news media position the problems posed by deepfakes and to assess how these
problems were framed in relation to one another in the earliest days of this technology.
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We identify four problems: deepfakes are easily produced and easily distributed; deepfakes promote false beliefs; deepfakes undermine the political process; and deepfakes
are used to make non-consensual sexual content. The goal of this paper is to examine
these problems to understand how deepfakes are presented to the public.

Cultural context
Deepfakes is a new technology, ﬁrst used for a familiar purpose: to objectify and demean
women. Misogyny is not, however, “built in” to the technology; instead, the decision to
use the technology to create sexual deepfakes rests with the users and reﬂects the misogynistic culture within which the technology is deployed (Burkell & Gosse, 2019; Vickery
& Everbach, 2018). In fact, fake porn—or, non-consensual sexual imagery—has long circulated in the public arena, and particularly in online spaces (Burkell & Gosse, 2019;
Maddocks, 2020). Sexual deepfakes, however, is the ﬁrst form of fake porn to receive
much attention in the news media. Sexual deepfakes are one of many ways in which
women are objectiﬁed in digital and visual culture (van der Nagel, 2020). They also
strip away the agency and autonomy of the women involved, including both the
person whose face is placed into the video and the adult performer whose body “is
erased, edited, and recirculated” (Maddocks, 2020, p. 2).
Mis/using images of women has been the subject of scholarly discussion since the 1970s,
when scholars began focusing on the problematic depiction of women in media (Kilbourne,
1979) and the overwhelming tendency to treat women as subjects to-be-looked-at rather
than subjects who do the looking (Mulvey, 1975). These critiques, and countless others, illuminate the limited and sexualized representation of women in North American popular
culture. The use of deepfakes to make non-consensual sexual content is intrinsically tied
to this culture (van der Nagel, 2020), but is also part of a larger trend that hijacks
women’s agency and privacy by using images—real or fabricated—to humiliate and disempower them (McGlynn et al., 2017; Powell et al., 2018). As van der Nagel (2020) argues, “By
treating women’s faces as a digital resource to be edited onto sexual bodies by artiﬁcial intelligence, [deepfakes] reinforces the idea that women exist as sexual objects” (p. 3).
The mis/use of women’s bodies in digital media is embedded within digital and visual
culture itself. Since its release in 1990, Photoshop and related image or video altering
software has been used to create sexualized images of women (McGlynn et al., 2017).
Over the last decade women’s digital intimate images in particular have been weaponized
and used to inﬂict harm. Collectively known as image-based (sexual) abuse, these practices include, among others, “relationship retribution,” “sextortion,” “sexual voyeurism,”
“sexploitation,” and “sexual assault” (Powell et al., 2018, p. 306). Of these practices, the
non-consensual distribution of intimate images, colloquially known as revenge porn, has
received the most attention (Bates, 2017; Citron, 2014). For the most part, image abuse
relies on having access to intimate images of the woman against whom the abuse is perpetrated. Deepfakes, however, undercuts that reliance, oﬀering the possibility of perpetrating image-based abuse without access to actual intimate photographs or videos of
the woman who is targeted. Using deepfakes, any woman can be made to appear in pornography: all that is required is a suﬃcient corpus of facial images, an appropriate pornographic video into which the woman’s face is to be placed, some technical know-how,
and deepfakes become one more, particularly powerful, way women’s bodies can be used
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against them. In this paper, we focus on women for two reasons. First, because that is the
language and approach of the articles in our data, and second, because there is no
research or data to understand how sexual deepfakes impact gender non-binary or transgender individuals. However, given what we know about online abuse more broadly,
which is that BIPOC, gender non-binary, and members of LGBT communities are disproportionately targeted, we believe that there needs to be a speciﬁc focus on the heightened vulnerability of equality and equity-deserving groups.
Deepfakes, and related software such as FakeApp and DeepNude, democratizes a
capacity that was historically restricted to experts in the entertainment industry:
namely, the ability to create convincing fabricated video of people doing and saying
things that did not happen in real life. Deepfakes remain somewhat diﬃcult to
produce, but as the technology grows more sophisticated the potential for more people
to create them becomes increasingly likely (see Burkell & Gosse, 2019). Since the initial
release and subsequent widespread use of the technology, deepfake productions have
been recognized for their potential to mislead audiences, especially when combined
with other applications such as realistic voice altering software. Although sexual deepfakes
remains the most common application (Ajder et al., 2019; Chesney & Citron, 2019), deepfakes have already been used for other ends, such as creating false videos of celebrities (e.g.
a series of Nicolas Cage videos; O’Reilly, 2018), and politicians (e.g. the fake Barack
Obama video produced by Jordan Peele and Buzzfeed; BuzzFeedVideo, 2018). These
examples diﬀer from the intention behind sexual deepfakes as they were created as a
form of entertainment and to demonstrate the power of deepfake technology. This is
very diﬀerent from the intention of sexual deepfakes—which admittedly varies, but objectively centers on demeaning, objectifying, and humiliating women.
Concerns about the production and circulation of false videos have naturally led to a
focus on content authentication and deepfake detection/identiﬁcation. Researchers have
been working toward creating detection techniques in order to verify and authenticate
content in order to minimize the potential negative impact of these productions;
however, even as new detection/authentication approaches are identiﬁed, producers of
the false videos are developing techniques to defeat them. For example, in 2018 researchers discovered one way to detect deepfakes: blinking (Li et al., 2018). Soon after, however,
higher rates of blinking became incorporated into new models of deepfakes, rendering
this detection technique useless. The result is, as Day (2019) puts it, a “computational
arms race … between coders who generate fakes and those who detect them” (p. 108).
Other, non-technical, solutions to the problem of deepfakes are also being explored.
Wagner and Blewer (2019) suggest that society also requires an understanding of the
sociopolitical nature of the problem. Speciﬁcally, they argue for a combination of visual
information literacy and a feminist approach to AI. They believe that “[u]nderstanding
the material implications of the hyperreality of deepfakes might be how one gets over
their becoming normalized” (p. 42). Part of this materiality is the unequal distribution
of who is seen and who does the seeing; there is a strong gender disparity between who
is impacted by deepfakes and who is not as women are consistently coded into sexual
deepfakes for the pleasure of others. For Wagner and Blewer (2019), critically minded
and feminist approaches to AI, in combination with preparing “persons to see things
with a lens that is not merely critical, but oriented towards a notion of social justice”
(p. 42), can potentially interrupt the trend of creating sexist and misogynistic deepfakes.
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One of the key concerns about deepfakes is the presentation of something “unreal” as
“real.” This concern operates in the realm of political disinformation, and also in the
realm of sexual deepfakes—but with sexual deepfakes there is the additional (and
perhaps more critical) issue of the representation itself. The problem of disinformation
can be addressed by more eﬀective detection and veriﬁcation techniques, coupled with
increased education of the viewing public to equip them to identify and discount “fake
news.” Detection, veriﬁcation, and even removal of sexual deepfakes, however, will not
mitigate the harms experienced by the women who are targeted. Detection and
removal are certainly important in this context, but there is a level of reputational
damage and a cognitive burden associated with someone else seeing, or you seeing yourself, in a sexually compromising ﬁlm or image that cannot be undone by detection and
removal strategies. For the women who have their faces used in sexual deepfakes, the
“damage has already been done” (Cox, 2018): detecting and removing the content will
help to contain, but will certainly not eliminate, the harm caused by these productions.
In the case of both sexual and political deepfakes, the technology stands to alter, and
indeed threaten, the cultural fabric. Public understanding of this technology is critical for
eﬀective responses, and for eﬀective participation in policy-making (Durant, 1999). Academic discussion of deepfakes is limited—though that is changing—partly because they
“are simply too recent for anyone [in academia] to have much perspective” (Fletcher,
2018, p. 457). As a result, the harms associated with deepfakes have been largely constructed by news media. As such, this coverage serves not only to educate the public,
but also to shape public understanding, and as such, knowing how problems associated
with deepfakes are framed becomes incredibly important.

Methods
Conceptual framework
Discourse analysis is a traditional and important method used in media and cultural
studies to help understand the way language and text shape systems of social meaning
(Fairclough, 1989; Tonkiss, 1998). Using a combination of critical and feminist discourse
analysis, we report on the way power relations unfold through the use of language and
the position of text. In particular, we critique the way power—especially patriarchal
power—naturalizes the treatment of certain kinds of harms. This naturalization occurs
through the subtle and sometimes ﬂagrant expression of beliefs and values that,
through repetition, appear as though they are “common sense” (Fairclough, 1989,
p. 77). Once they appear as common sense, it is easier for discursive practices that replicate power imbalances to go undetected and unchallenged.
Discourse analysis also provides a great deal of freedom to think critically about the
phenomenon under study. As a method, it does not pretend to be objective because
the data themselves are not objective, and the motivation for applying the framework
is overtly political. Feminist critical discourse analysis, in particular, is part of “an emancipatory critical social science which […] is openly committed to the achievement of a
just social order through a critique of discourse” (Lazar, 2007, p. 145). Drawing on
Lather (1986, p. 259), Lazar (2007) argues that feminist critical discourse analysis “is
scholarship that makes its biases part of its argument” (p. 146).
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In discourse analysis the reasons for being interested in a particular topic become critical
parts of the analysis (Johannesson, 2010). In this study, a concern over how deepfakes are
being presented to audiences of news media is the central concern. Using a feminist critical
discourse lens, we investigate how problems with technology are framed for public consumption, examine who those problems impact, and highlight whose experiences are left
out.
Data collection, sample & analysis of news coverage
We used Factiva, a news media search engine, to gather articles with the terms “deepfake/
s” and/or “fakeapp” in the headline or body. We used the term deepfake/s for obvious
reasons, and added the term fakeapp because it was the name of an application
created around the time of data collection that helped automate the creation of deepfakes.
Factiva provided us with a corpus of articles drawn from English language major publications from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, such as the Washington Post and the New Yorker, the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star, and the
Guardian and BBC, as well as regional newspapers that circulate oﬄine and/or online.
Overall, our sample represents news media from a variety of larger, well-known publications, as well as smaller scale, local publications.
Results were limited to English language articles published between 1 December 2017
(shortly before news of deepfakes broke) and 31 October 2018 (when we began data
analysis). The initial search returned 325 articles. Close duplicates (i.e. articles by the
same author, using the same sources and quotes) were removed through a combination
of automatic ﬁltering provided by Factiva and manual review. Articles not topically
related to deepfakes and compilations of weekly news that tangentially mentioned deepfakes were also removed. These ﬁltering processes resulted in a ﬁnal sample of 123 unique
articles, all addressing deepfakes or fakeapp.
We then used Nvivo 12, a qualitative analysis software, to navigate data analysis. First,
we coded every problem discussed in our dataset. Second, we identiﬁed the primary focus
and main problem for each article. Third, we grouped main problems according to
themes. At this stage both authors and a third research assistant grouped these codes
together independently. We then discussed our themes, reconciled any discrepancies,
and ﬁnalized our ﬁnal four themes. Last, we went back to the original coded problems
in the ﬁrst step and organized them according to our four themes. This stage was also
done independently by three coders, followed by another process of discussing,
reﬁning, and ﬁnalizing. Nvivo 12 also helped us keep track of discursive tendencies we
noticed in the sample (as discussed below under Hierarchy of Harm). In the following
section, we outline what news media tell the public about the problems associated with
deepfakes. We intentionally did not speculate or expand on the problems. As such, the
ﬁndings below are a reﬂection of the data, separate from how we view the problems.

Findings
Although deepfake technology can be used, as one story puts it, for “good and evil”
(Article 91), in general the press coverage we sampled identiﬁed deepfakes as problematic
with potential negative consequences. A small subset of article discussed the humorous
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use of deepfakes, like placing Nicholas Cage’s face in ﬁlms like Lord of the Rings and
Indiana Jones, and the potential of this technology for use by Hollywood. Overwhelmingly, however, news coverage positioned the problems and consequences associated
with deepfakes in four partially overlapping ways. The ﬁrst identiﬁed problem focused
on how easy it is to create and share false video content using deepfakes and applications
like FakeApp. The second was the possibility that deepfakes could lead audiences to false
beliefs and disrupt any semblance of a shared framework for understanding reality. The
third problem was that deepfakes could undermine the political process in the form of
disinformation and fake news. And the fourth problem was the use of deepfakes to
create non-consensual sexual videos.
Problem one: deepfakes are easily produced and easily distributed
The ﬁrst identiﬁed problem in the press coverage reﬂected a widespread belief that deepfakes can be easily produced and distributed. This belief hinged on three conditions that,
together, magnify the potential consequences of deepfakes: accessibility of software;
availability of data; and an environment that lacks veriﬁcation of shared content.
The ﬁrst condition focused on the accessibility of the technology used to create
deepfakes. FakeApp, an application that allows users to easily create deepfakes,
became available online in early 2018 to anyone with a desktop computer. The
program basically automated the creation of deepfakes. As one article noted, “the
New York Times reported on technology available for download on the internet
that enables ordinary people with access to computer networks to create fake videos
that are nearly undetectable as fake” (Article, 118). The interesting part of this positioning is the use of the word ordinary, which indicates and underlines the fear associated with a powerful piece of new technology falling into the hands of average online
users. The coverage also points out that the ease of production will only increase as the
technology inevitably and quickly improves: “ … FakeApp and its ilk are getting better
and easier to use by the day. During our month-long testing of FakeApp it has evolved
from a jury-rigged bundle of command-line utilities to a fairly slick one-button application” (Article 42).
The second condition rests on the fact that the production of deepfakes requires large
quantities of images of the individual being swapped into or superimposed on to (note:
neither of these terms are entirely accurate) the fabricated video, and that such quantities
are readily available. Press coverage pointed out that there is an abundance of available
content of celebrities and politicians that can be used to create realistic deepfakes. While
public ﬁgures are obviously accessible targets, articles also reminded readers that social
media creates optimal conditions for the potential creation of deepfakes that feature
anyone. As one article notes, “[…] people today are constantly uploading photos of
themselves to various social media platforms, meaning someone could use such a technique to harass someone they know” (Article 61). Another article states:
Recently, the anonymous administrator from a deepfake porn site announced that they want
to “democratise” the practice of deepfaking—making it easier than ever to splice people you
know into explicit porn ﬁlms … All anyone needs to create fake porn is a selﬁe or video of
their target—and there’s more than enough of those ﬂoating around the web. (Article 3,
emphasis added)
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Discussion of the third condition, that digital environments lack veriﬁcation of shared
content, was less obvious than the previous two conditions—though nonetheless
present—and strongly intersects with the other problems identiﬁed in this paper. This
condition emphasizes a lack of careful attention by users to the sources of information
shared online as well as the ability to easily share content, which means that deepfakes
can “quickly go viral online” (Article 88). It thus cautions that because unveriﬁed
content can be easily shared, deepfakes can and will become a “very powerful way to disseminate credible disinformation to the world” (Article 58).
By writing about deepfakes using these conditions, news media constructs an idea of
harm that points to problems outside of the technology itself. Things like the environments in which deepfakes exist, which is one that encourages cursory engagement
through likes and shares, and the accessibility and availability of the necessary software
and data, impresses on readers that the problems presented by deepfakes are a problem
with the digital ecosystem. This moves responsibility away from people who choose to
use the technology for nefarious purposes, and instead toward less tangible by-products
of digital environments. There is even an element of “victim-blaming” in this discourse,
which focuses on the availability of images (in many cases uploaded by “everyday” users
into social media proﬁles) as part of the problem.

Problem two: deepfakes promote false beliefs
The second problem identiﬁed in the press coverage was that the technology “will eventually fool even the sharpest eyes” (Article 77), and that viewers might come to hold false
beliefs as a result of fake content. Current deepfakes are far from perfect, and many can
be easily distinguished from actual video content. There is no doubt, however, the technology will improve over time, with the eventual result that false videos will be indistinguishable from true recordings. As one writer notes: “Photo manipulation technology
long ago took away still photos’ value as incontrovertible proof of something. Now we
can add fake videos that, like the computergenerated graphics in motion pictures, can
make the unreal seem completely plausible” (Article 118). As one article states, sophisticated video altering software presents socio-political concerns, including the potential
“for police bodycam footage to be tampered with” (Article 112).
The obvious problem that false videos could lead to speciﬁc false beliefs was related, in
much of the coverage, to the larger concern that false videos could undermine our shared
reality and agreement on basic facts—both by representing as “true” that which is not,
and by leaving audiences unsure what, if any, content can be trusted. As one reporter
explained, “[…] with the looming horizon of computer generated ‘deepfakes’ [..] the
line between reality and ﬁction is blurring” (Article 32). Commentary reﬂecting this
issue includes:
No voice is safe. No image is safe. Incorporate AR (artiﬁcial reality) techniques into this “end
of the truth” scenario, and we simply will not be able to tell reality from ﬁction. If you can’t
believe your eyes and your ears, what can you believe? (Article 76).

And similarly: “If you can’t tell a fake from reality, then it becomes easy to question the
authenticity of anything” (Article 55). One article oﬀered a particularly pithy summary:
“Seeing isn’t believing anymore” (Article 65).
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The overall concern here is that deepfakes accelerate an already eroding trust in the
things we see, hear, and read. In so doing, they blur the lines of reality and cause
damage to the audiences who view them. While the issue of false beliefs was prominent enough to be considered a problem in itself, a concern over political content
(read: politicians saying things they did not actually say, propaganda, etc.) was typically
associated with this problem (and thus is deeply connected to problem three, noted
below).
Problem three: deepfakes undermine the political process
The third problem focused on the potential political fallout of false videos. The news
articles raised the concern that this could undermine the electoral process, threaten
national security, and operate as an extension of the ongoing issue of fake news and disinformation. The strong focus on this concern demonstrated in these articles might be
partly explained by considering other news headlines circulating at the time of data collection. In the timeframe for which we collected data there was increased concern and
coverage about alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US federal elections (Galante
& Shaun, 2018), and the articles focused on the possible implications for future elections.
For example, one article notes that “[researchers are] betting whether or not someone
will create a so-called Deepfake video about a political candidate that receives more
than 2 million views before getting debunked by the end of 2018” (Article 47; spoiler:
there was no such video).
Concerns about the impact of synthetic video on the electoral process were rooted in
the notion that these productions could create false beliefs in audiences. Deepfake productions were discussed as “videos that can appear to present a person, even a politician,
saying or doing something they never actually did” (Article 92). The coverage includes
many evocative examples: one story, for example, states “Any given person can now
create propaganda on their political enemies. President Trump’s face can be superimposed into a video of him doing cocaine, or a young Bernie Sanders can be shown in
KKK rallies … ” (Article 91).
The concern that synthesized video could undermine our shared sense of reality was
itself viewed as a speciﬁc threat to democracy: “‘Democracy assumes that its citizens
share the same reality,’ an op-ed concluded, ‘We’re about to ﬁnd out whether democracy
can be preserved when this assumption no longer holds’” (Article 70).
Readers were also cautioned that disinformation in the form of synthesized video
could lead to “[a] misinformed public, moral outrage, and greater polarization”
(Olson, 2018). Deepfakes were positioned as being used potentially by “Russian foes in
disinformation campaigns” (Murphy, 2018) for “political sabotage and propaganda”
(Article 118), and as having the potential to “stir up conﬂict between nations or communities” (Article 74) since they could, for example, “be used to produce convincing video of
Donald Trump making abusive remarks about Muslims or Vladimir Putin declaring war
on Britain” (Article 74). One article quoted Edward Lucas, senior vice president of the
Centre for European Policy Analysis, as saying: “We’re rapidly moving into an era
where the Russians, or any other adversary, can create our public ﬁgures saying or
doing things that are disgraceful or highly corrosive to public trust … And we’re not
remotely ready for this” (Article 42).
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The need for better detection—identifying false or synthesized videos—was often
ﬂagged as a critical response to political or security concerns. This issue arose in the
press coverage in relation to reports of funding by the United States Department of
Defense for a project focused on the detection of fake videos. For example:
The Defence Department’s Darpa [sic] agency wants machines that can adapt to their
environment and are better at spotting counterfeit imagery. The US military is backing
artiﬁcial intelligence research into areas including systems with “common sense” and networks that can spot images manufactured by other AIs (Article 14).

The coverage focused primarily on the diﬃculty of detecting these videos; for example,
one article noted that “the kind of tech Darpa [sic] is pinning its hopes on is ‘decades
away’” (Article 27).
The articles in our sample seemed to construct a fear of deepfakes as the “ultimate”
threat to a democratic society. While fake news and disinformation do pose risks to audiences, and this is a legitimate concern to have, the coverage that took this angle relied
primarily on hypothetical scenarios, possibly stoking fears over deepfake uses that
have not yet been realized. Absent from the coverage is any discussion over how
sexual deepfakes can also dupe voters and undermined political processes “just as
much as any digitally manipulated political speech” (Maddocks, 2020, p. 4).

Problem four: deepfakes are used to make non-consensual sexual content
The fourth problem centered on the use of deepfakes to create non-consensual sexual
deepfakes. In the articles where this issue was more than just tangentially mentioned,
this issue was discussed in two ways: social media companies’ responses to such
content and the harms such content poses to women.
Much of the discussion around sexual deepfakes centered on reports that websites like
PornHub, Reddit, and Tumblr, among others, were publicly decrying sexual deepfakes and
announcing their eﬀorts to remove and ban them from their websites. “Twitter, Reddit and
Pornhub have all become the latest top web platforms to ban AI-generated pornography,
also known as ‘deepfakes,’ after terming it as non-consensual porn” (Article 80). These
articles highlighted the misogynistic intent for which deepfakes are being used, which certainly raises awareness that this is a central issue within the scope of deepfake technology,
but the main point was to notify readers of social media companies’ responses.
Broadly speaking, there were three harms to women mentioned in the press coverage:
emotional and psychological distress; loss of autonomy to one’s body and one’s reputation; and the connection between deepfakes and other possible crimes.
While there was some discussion of the emotional and psychological harm caused by
deepfakes, for example, explaining that this type of victimization can leave victims
“feeling distressed and humiliated” (Article 3), this coverage typically extrapolated
from more well-known cases of cybermisogyny, such as non-consensual distribution
of intimate images. For example, one article quoted a woman who explains: “The aftermath [of having intimate images non-consensually shared] is worse, not knowing who
will see it and who has already. Your life becomes a constant worry” (Article 3).
News media also discussed the lack of consent involved in deepfakes. While one article
describes deepfakes as “violat[ing] bodily autonomy on an industrial scale” (Article 42),
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most articles limited their discussion of consent to simply pointing out that pornographic
deepfakes are created without the consent of the women in them. Speciﬁcally, the articles
focused on the women whose faces were placed in the videos, not the adult performers
whose bodies were also violated. Relatedly, there was some concern raised over the implications deepfakes have for women’s reputations: “Some deepfake videos may create false
statements of fact about a person’s presence and actions that lead to a loss of reputation of
that person” (Article 54). In most cases, however, the focus of concern was directed
toward celebrities, in part because deepfakes targeting celebrities gained the most notoriety. For example, one article discussing Emma Watson and Gal Gadot explains: “There is
an obvious problem here—it deals with concern about their image and the violation that
they experience by the implication they are involved in such a ﬁlm” (Article 91).
Lastly, there was a concern that targets of deepfakes might become victims of abuse
and identiﬁable crimes such as harassment, defamation, blackmail and extortion. In
this way deepfakes was often aligned with other types of online abuse, and imagebased abuse in particular. For example, during the period covered in our data, the
United Kingdom (UK) had recently criminalized “upskirting,” or the act of surreptitiously taking photos underneath a woman’s skirt. In the press coverage, the new ban
on upskirting was connected to wider trends in cybermisogyny and used to highlight
the diﬃculty of developing legal responses to problems associated with new technology,
many of which disproportionately impact of equality and equity-deserving groups.
“Online abuse is the focus of signiﬁcant feminist activism these days, as social media platforms ﬂail ineﬀectually against a torrent of cyber-misogyny.” The law has struggled to keep
up with technology, in particular around image-based abuses. “Deepfake” porn—producing
fake pornographic images based on pictures of real people—is the latest tech-enabled sexual
abuse to attract demands for a ban (Article 15).

Disappointingly, the objectiﬁcation of women and misogynistic intent of sexual deepfakes was rarely, if at all, mentioned in our sample. One exception is an article that mentioned the degradation that would obviously come as a result of sexual deepfakes: “In
many cases these videos are pornographic, some containing celebrities, and others featuring people known to the creator. They are all equally degrading” (Article 43).

A hierarchy of harms
In many of the articles, sexual deepfakes served the role of “origin story,” providing a
segue into discussions of other consequences. The following quote is typical of this
treatment:
Predictably, faceswapping tech was quickly hijacked by the darker corners of the internet, in
particular for inserting celebrities’ faces on to actors in pornographic ﬁlms. There are also
fears it could be used to spread political disinformation on social media, potentially inﬂuencing the outcome of elections. As people become wise to fake news stories, will they start to
be fooled instead by fake videos? Imagine the inﬂammatory lies that could be added to the
lips of politicians (Article 23).

While it is important to trace the history to provide context for the discussions of deepfakes, the fact that sexual deepfakes is framed as a background story is a problem. In 2019
the startup DeepTrace—whose primary objective is to research “deepfakes evolving
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capabilities and threats” and provide “crucial intelligence for enhancing our detection
technology”—conducted the most comprehensive study of deepfakes to date (Ajder
et al., 2019). Analyzing 14,678 deepfake videos, which they admit is not an exhaustive
sample, they reported that 96% of their dataset was pornographic (Ajder et al., 2019).
In other words, the issue of sexual deepfakes is not a background issue—it remains overwhelmingly true that to talk about deepfakes is to talk about fake pornography.
Even when deepfakes pornography is not relegated to the position of “background” or
“origin story,” this use of the technology is often positioned as less important than the use
of deepfakes to promulgate false information:
Late last year, so-called “deepfake” pornographic videos began to surface online, with celebrity faces realistically melded to diﬀerent bodies. “It happened in the regime of pornography
rather than propaganda,” said Jack Clark, head of policy at OpenAI … “But nothing about
deepfakes suggests it can’t be applied to propaganda” (Article 4).

In this quote, Clark seems to be subtly suggesting that an application of deepfakes to propaganda would be more serious than its use in sexual deepfakes. The same suggestion is
made in another article:
Deepfakes, as they are known, are videos that use machine learning to superimpose one
person’s face into the video of another person. It has been used to make fake pornographic
videos of celebrities, and with the right editing, it can be entirely convincing. However, there
is an even more nefarious use for the technology. Foreign powers or even domestic troublemakers could use the techniques to create propaganda or synthesized events (Article 54,
emphasis added).

Another article is more explicit in subordinating the harms experienced by targets of
deepfakes (including porn) to the harms experienced by those who view fake news:
Who are the victims of deepfakes? Is it the women who’ve been blackmailed with nonconsensual and completely fabricated revenge porn videos, their faces stitched onto pornstars’
bodies via artiﬁcial intelligence (AI)? Is it actor Nicholas Cage? … It’s broader than either,
the US Department of Defense says. Rather, it’s all of us who are exposed to fake news and
run the risk of getting riled up by garbage (Article 112, emphasis added).

Throughout the articles certain types of falsiﬁed content were given more attention and
concern. Indeed, the use of deepfakes for political (propaganda) purposes is identiﬁed
explicitly as a “bigger worry” (Article 18) than sexual deepfakes. One article notes that
while the software is “currently used mainly in porn ﬂicks […] it may not be long,
though, before fake ‘political’ videos are created” (Article 62); another warns that
“with enough time and technological advancement, political speeches could be
falsiﬁed, and ‘fake news’ could become a genuine threat” (Article 20). The message,
though subtle, is repeated enough to be abundantly clear: the threat presented by deepfakes pornography is less serious, less genuine, and less signiﬁcant than the potential political consequences of fake news and disinformation.
There is no doubt that synthetic video could undermine the electoral process and
threaten national security; there is also no question that these productions could undermine our sense of a shared reality. These concerns, however, are obviously diﬀerent in
nature from the personal harms experienced by targets of sexual deepfakes, who face
reputational harm, damage to their emotional and psychological wellbeing, and whose
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content is being altered and recirculated without their consent (Bates, 2017). News coverage that treats deepfakes pornography as subordinate to fake news eﬀectively elides the
harms associated with sexual deepfakes, rendering those consequences, and the women
who are aﬀected, invisible in the public view. As mentioned previously, when the targets
of sexual deepfakes were discussed, the focus was on the women whose faces were used,
not the Adult performers bodies; more speciﬁcally, celebrities were often used as
examples in lieu of less public-facing examples. Coverage also focused on cis-gendered
women as targets of deepfakes and did not extend their discussion to transgender or
non-binary individuals. These elements of coverage—public facing, cis-gendered
women—suggests a tendency to prioritize certain types of harm and sends messages
about whose harm matters most.
Across the coverage of deepfakes, there was recognition of a range of possible harms
or problems, all rooted in the fact that deepfakes allows the production of synthetic
video that is increasingly diﬃcult to distinguish from the “real” thing. The themes
of harm to the audience of these productions (e.g. creating false beliefs and undermining the political process) and harm to the targets (e.g. the women in sexual deepfakes)
of these productions were both discussed in the media coverage. Given that the coverage recognized both audience and subjects as experiencing harm, it is somewhat surprising that in many cases the discussions suggested that one harm—the harm to
targets, especially from sexual deepfakes—was subordinated to the other—the harm
to the audience of fake news and political productions. This positioning is relatively
subtle, and surprisingly consistent, representing not a wholesale denial of the
problem of sexual deepfakes and the consequences for women, but instead a selective
emphasis on the social and political consequences of the use of deepfakes to create and
spread fake news and disinformation. Noting her impression of the response to deepfakes, Maddocks (2020) writes that there is an overwhelming focus on “political deep
fakes, while their pornographic counterparts have become part of the scenery in cyberspace” (p. 2).
Surprisingly, even when articles clearly stated there was an “obvious problem” (Article
91) with deepfakes, that “obvious problem” did not focus on the doing, choosing, and
creating of deepfakes—for pornographic or political ends. Missing entirely from this coverage is any discussion about who is making these deepfakes and what in our culture
permits this clear transgression. Countless women have had their images doctored to
make those images appear sexual in nature. The use of deepfakes for this end is part
of a larger socio-cultural pattern of misogynistic behavior, and the connection
between the speciﬁc problem of sexual deepfakes and the larger misogynistic social
context is largely neglected in the press coverage.

Conclusion
The goal of this study was to understand how new media construct the problems associated with deepfakes. In our research, we asked the question: how does news media
characterize the problems presented by deepfakes? The answer is that deepfakes is presented primarily as a problem for the audiences of the fake video productions, who
are at risk of being misled by false videos produced with a new, easy to use, technology.
Future and as yet hypothetical consequences of false videos, including fake news and
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disinformation, election disruption, and threats to national security, consistently received
more attention, both in content and context, than did the harms associated with the
dominant and existing use of deepfakes to create non-consensual sexual content. The
intense focus in the news coverage of deepfakes on politics and fake news promotes
the need to prepare for the (inevitable) political misuse of deepfake technology. When,
however, this coverage fails to distinguish the harms associated with sexual deepfakes
from the potential harms of political disruption and disinformation, it demonstrates a
disregard for the impact of sexual deepfakes on the lives of women, and more to the
point a disregard for the social and cultural factors that underpin this use of deepfake
technology. Like news media, “images might not tell the truth, but they do tell us something: what is desirable, for example, or what is worth paying attention to” (van der
Nagel, 2020, p. 4). By failing to tell a more inclusive story, the articles in our sample
can limit public perception and aﬀective and institutional responses.
The continuing outright misogynistic use of deepfakes, speciﬁcally for the creation
and distribution of non-consensual sexual content, ought to be an important element
in any discussion of the technology. Even as the misogynistic use of deepfakes continues, the concern for the use of deepfakes to spread disinformation for politically
nefarious ends grows. Our concern is that the harm caused by sexual deepfakes,
and thus the harm to the women in such videos, is overshadowed by other
concerns. The harm associated with sexual deepfakes cannot be subsumed under
other harms: instead, they are diﬀerent harms, which in our opinion should carry
equal weight. The real danger is in the subordination of the misogynistic harms to
political harms.
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